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Abstract
The US Government’s decision in 2003 to allow embedded journalists to cover the war in Iraq
represented a significant change in the attitude of military commanders to their relationship with
journalists. This marked the end of four decades of anti-media sentiment. The new relationship was
predicated on the understanding that the media has the capacity to shape public attitudes towards the
conflict. This paper explores whether the US military’s strategy, which was underpinned by a desire
that the media produce positive coverage, worked. It also explores whether objectivity, a journalistic
staple, is a victim of such a policy.
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Introduction
In March 2003, U.S. and allied military forces invaded Iraq with the expressed
purpose of deposing its president, Saddam Hussein, and liberating the Iraqi people
from his tyrannical rule. The impetus for such actions was framed in terms of the
ongoing United States’ war on terrorism, begun after the September 11, 2001 attacks
on the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon by Al‑Qaeda terrorists. At
the time, the United States government argued that there were links between Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden, the leader of Al‑Qaeda, and that
President Hussein possessed a significant and threatening stockpile of weapons of mass
destruction that he could use to attack the United States within a moment’s notice.
This war is significant for a number of structural and doctrinal changes that took
place with it. First, President Bush employed a new U.S. foreign policy doctrine,
known as the Bush Doctrine, that allowed the president, “to describe its decision to
attack first, without an overt act of…provocation” in cases where there are perceived
direct threats to the United States (Rampton and Sauber, 2003: 126).  This war also
saw an important structural change in the relationship between military and media,
called embedded journalism, described as “military jargon for a reporter who is to be
stationed with a ‘unit’” (Gay, 2003: A16).
Throughout the formal period of war, beginning in early March 2003, and to a lesser
extent after the formal war was concluded several weeks later, certain journalists
were allowed to travel with military units and to independently publish their work
with minimal military or government censorship and scrutiny.  Recent technological
advancements that made reporting from the field possible in desert conditions were
partly responsible for this newly conceived access, but perhaps more importantly,
according to Rampton and Stauber, it resulted from the realisation of tension between
military and media, and the idea that “media coverage of any…operation will, to a large
extent, shape public perception” (p. 185). Such realisations substantially altered “nearly
four decades of anti‑media sentiment” within the military establishment, motivating the
Department of Defense to put forth this savvier doctrine (Gay, 2003: 16).
Verne Gay (2003) writes that “embeds potentially could give millions of viewers a
front‑row seat to the war, live and uncut…you need only consult your…history book
to know that nothing like this has ever happened” (p. 16). In practice embedded
journalists produced dramatic news and imagery consisting of first‑hand accounts of
battles, explosions, human suffering, military success and defeat. Embedded journalists
interviewed soldiers and commanders about ongoing battles and situations and
reported observations about the war, Iraqi civilians and military personnel.  Here were
reporters with very limited contact and information about the larger war going on
around them. They reported what they saw and felt. Embedded journalists were tied
to their sources ‑‑ the U.S. military commanders and personnel with whom they were
embedded. Though they produced interesting, dramatic and exciting coverage, the
merit and long‑term implications of embedding journalists are still to be established.
In light of this new form of war journalism, it is important to understand how
embedding journalists alters the way that a conflict is covered as news, and the impact
that such coverage can have on news consumers. This study will attempt to explore
answers to the first of these two questions. According to media scholar Marvin Kalb,
embedding journalists was an attempt by the Department of Defense to ensure “proud,
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positive, patriotic coverage” of the war (p. 34). It is worth testing whether the DoD’s
plan played out.

Literature Review
Previous attempts to analyse the military/media relationship have been numerous
and diversity exists in both methodology and conclusions. One factor contributing
to this diversity is the shifting character of the relationship between the media and
the military over time. The long relationship between military and media has led to
frustration on both sides, as well as among the public. According to Greg McLaughlin:
One of the most enduring myths in the recent history of war reporting is the
‘Vietnam Syndrome,’ the widespread belief that the mainstream American
media were opposed to the Vietnam War and openly hostile to the US military
and its South Vietnamese clients; and that as a result of their critical coverage
they lost the war for the U.S. (p. 73).
This type of thinking has prevailed within the military since the Vietnam War,
contributing to public relations counter‑campaigns such as those in which journalists
“who questioned any aspect of official policy [were] [labelled] at best ‘a liberal,’ at
worst a ‘communist’”(p. 75). In subsequent military operations, the military has
attempted to manage media access and content. In the 1983 invasion of Granada,
for instance, “the military excluded the news media from their immediate area of
operations,” (p. 84) and, as Douglas Kellner writes, in the 1991 Persian Gulf War,
“the Bush administration and the Pentagon produced a barrage of propaganda,
disinformation, and outright lies that covered over the more unsavory aspects of the
Gulf War and that legitimated U.S. policies” (p. 1). Meanwhile, journalists covering
the Persian Gulf War were relegated to closely guarded press pools and allowed only
limited access to military action.
The military’s emphasis on secrecy, safety, and message management and its belief in
the media’s potential negative effect on war have tended to lead military leadership to
look skeptically on the work of war reporters. Similarly, reporters’ attempts to unearth
sensational stories and their drive for better ratings and circulation have historically
created negative sentiments in the military. Through embedding, this was all supposed
to change. In February, 2003 Conor O’Clery, a journalist for the Irish Times, suggested
that US military leadership “sees [embedding] as an improvement on the pool system
used in the 1991 Gulf War, when a pool reporter would be taken to the ‘front’ and
would share his material”.
A central factor of many critiques of the media/military relationship is the question of
objectivity. In war journalism, objectivity comes under increased pressure. According
to Gregory McLaughlin (2002), journalistic coverage of war is limited by “military
security, [and] standards of taste and decency with respect to pictures of dead and
wounded,” as well as the journalist’s political and patriotic allegiances and personal
feelings about a war’s justification (p. 80). In extreme cases journalists have crossed the
line and become combatants on one side or another of a conflict (p. 155).
Embedded journalists in Iraq were attacked along with their regiments: they were in
harm’s way. Kalb writes that embedded journalists “[were] on the firing line, facing
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the same sandstorms, fearing chemical attacks from a desperate Saddam Hussein,
experiencing many of the same dangers. They [had] been warned that their casualty
rates may be higher than in earlier conflicts” (p. 34). As suggested by Newsweek
reporter Jonathan Alter (2003) before the war:“if [journalists] endanger the unit, they
know they’re endangering themselves.”  He writes: “if you travel with a group over
a period of weeks, especially one that is providing you protection from chemical or
biological attack, you’re more likely to stay loyal to the people you’re with.” This
feature of embedded journalism, in which journalists forge relationships of dependence
and safety with the subjects of their stories, can significantly affect a journalist’s
objectivity. Critics of journalistic objectivity/subjectivity during the war are supported
by journalists’ own accounts of self‑censorship, friendly reporting, and complying with
military wishes that they not report particular aspects of the conflict.
The theoretical bases for this study include those which pertain to the two related
concepts of objectivity and patriotism.  Principal among these is Herman and
Chomsky’s (1988) notion of manufacturing consent, in which the authors contend
that media content is influenced by five factors, including “reliance of the media on
information provided by government… [and] ‘anticommunism’ as a national religion
and control mechanism”(p. 2). Because of the fall of the Soviet Union and the end
of the Cold War, anticommunism is no longer the norm to which American political
and social life subscribe. I contend that the concept could easily be replaced with
“antiterrorism,” one of the strongest factors cited as contributing to the decision
to proceed with this war.  Herman and Chomsky’s concepts speak to the powerful
influences that source, personal and political pressure can have on objectivity.
While Herman and Chomsky’s theory is relevant to all journalism, a second theoretical
question, the “fog of war,” speaks more directly to the dilemma of embedded
journalists. Journalism scholar Greg McLaughlin argues that “objectivity is based on
the assumption that a series of ‘facts’ or truth claims about the world can be validated
by the rules and procedures of a professional community” (2002: 161). In order to
mitigate the effects of propaganda and bias, journalists “put the emphasis of coverage
on reporting and gathering facts” (p. 158). Against this, Brent MacGregor (1997) uses
the term “fog of war” to describe a situation in which journalists covering a war zone
“can be surprisingly isolated, having only their individual point of view on events
which can in fact be limited by the very proximity and unique perspective which
makes their reports valuable” (p. 55).
According to the fog of war thesis, combat reporters, isolated and dependent on
limited resources, will sometimes report skewed and inconsistent information. A
corollary argument is made by McLaughlin, who questions journalists’ capacity for
objectivity related to “propaganda from…their own side: their unwillingness to
challenge reporting restrictions, their enjoyment of the razzmatazz of the briefings and
their susceptibility to disinformation and dissemblage, and their failure to corroborate
source information against alternative material” (p. 101). Though written before
the Iraq war, McLaughlin’s and MacGregor’s ideas are relevant to the current study:
objectivity can be further challenged by embedding U.S. journalists with U.S. military
units because of their limited vision in the war zone and their propensity to accept
statements made by representatives of their own side.
The embedded journalist is therefore a potential victim of subjectivity from within
and without. Their personal proclivity to support their side in times of war combined
162
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with their limited vision trends their coverage toward subjective, pro‑U.S. accounts of
the war.  Added to these are the organisational factors cited by Herman and Chomsky
and, as suggested by such journalism critics as Sheldon Rampton and John Stauber
(2003), the tendency of U.S. news organisations since September 11, 2001, to take
on a more patriotic tone (p. 171). Finally, the structural factors that influence all
journalism should play a role in the embedded journalists’ coverage of the war, which
means it will tend toward sensationalism and reinforce dominant American themes
(pro‑democracy, pro‑western).

Methodology
This quantitative research was intended as a preliminary and exploratory study, aimed
at discerning if there are quantifiable differences in war coverage, depending on the
location of the reporter, and the reporter’s relation to the military (i.e. embedded or
not). This study was limited to the analysis of embedded journalists writing for the
Washington Post, a well‑respected newspaper that is known for journalistic quality and
its nationwide appeal. The Washington Post was an ideal choice for this project because
in addition to its 11 embedded journalists, the Washington Post covered the war from a
variety of other locations around the globe, including inside Iraq (non‑embedded). The
Washington Post is distributed both nationally and internationally, so its opportunity for
influence is significant.
The project’s sample was developed randomly from the entire body of Washington Post
articles published during the period of formal war, between the period of 20 March
and 1 May 2003. From this date‑range, 10 days were randomly selected and every
non‑editorial Washington Post article that mentioned the term “Iraq” within its text
was collected, for a total of 395 articles.
The content of the articles was analysed in conjunction with data pertaining to the
journalist’s physical location to determine whether differences in coverage biases were
evident between journalists in different geographic locations and situations. However,
because the concepts of patriotism and objectivity are somewhat amorphous and
without clear operational capacity, it was necessary to define these terms through the
analysis of related concepts and through assessment of the author’s tone.
Operational definitions were developed to quantify journalists’ presentation of
concepts related to the war. The following represents these definitions:
1.
2.

3.
4.
5.

President George Bush and Cabinet – Includes Mr. Bush, his closest advisors
and aides.
U.S. Military Administration and Operation – References to large‑scale troop
deployments, movements and successes. This category also includes references to
how the military was prepared for warfare, and its treatment of Iraqi civilians.
U.S. Military Soldiers –This category included small groups of soldiers,
individual soldiers and relations between soldiers and civilians.
President Saddam Hussein – All references to the deposed Iraqi leader.
Iraqi Governmental and Military Administration and Operation
– Unlike the U.S. government, where there are clear distinctions between
governmental and military leadership, this distinction was difficult to make
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regarding the Iraqi leadership. I therefore included all Iraqi leadership (excluding
Hussein) in this category.  This also included references to Iraq’s war effort,
various military organisations, large troop deployments, and atrocities that were
attributed to the military or governmental organisations.
6. Iraqi Military Soldiers – Any reference to Iraqi soldiers and their activity (not
including official/administrative activity). Refers mostly to day‑to‑day interaction
with Iraqis in battle.
Other categories: Osama bin Laden/Al Qaeda, President Chirac/France, U.S.
government leadership, post‑war planning and events, American public, Iraqi
public, war protesters, and mass media.
The categories were analysed in each paragraph of every article, to determine if the
author’s reference to each was favorable, neutral, or unfavorable (using a 3 point scale
in which 1=unfavorable, 2=neutral and 3=favorable).  The average score of each article
containing a reference to a concept was then calculated and recorded. Intercoder
reliability was achieved with the help of a colleague at the University of Colorado at
Boulder, using Scott’s Pi formulation. The average Scott’s Pi score was .88 and ranged
between .64 for Iraqi Soldiers, and 1 for Osama Bin Laden, Iraqi Military, Post‑War
Planning, the US Public and Protesters.
Based on the concepts indicated above, the research was directed toward elucidating
the following hypotheses about journalists’ coverage of the war:
Hypotheses:
H1: U.S. embedded journalists’ coverage of U.S. military soldiers and leadership will
tend to be more favorable than the coverage of those U.S. journalists who are not
embedded.
H2: U.S. embedded journalists’ coverage of Iraqi soldiers will be less favorable than
the coverage of those U.S. journalists who are not embedded.
H3: U.S. embedded journalists’ coverage will be less favorable toward President
Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi military establishment than the coverage of
non‑embedded U.S. journalists.
H4: Due to proximity, U.S. embedded journalists will portray the U.S. government’s
actions and decision‑making less favorably than the coverage of non‑embedded
U.S. journalists. Note: I expect H4 to prove a null hypothesis:
If the first hypothesis is correct, articles by embedded journalists will have relatively
higher levels of favorability for the U.S. military. Similarly, if hypotheses 2 and 3 are
correct, articles by embedded journalists should display relatively unfavorably accounts
of Iraqi leadership, military and soldiers. Finally, if null‑hypothesis 4 is correct, all articles
written within the period, regardless of where the journalist was stationed, should display
similarly high favorability for support of the war and the U.S. government.
The relative levels of favorability for each category should clearly indicate the
degree to which each article is biased toward U.S. patriotism. This information,
when combined with data about the author’s location, should indicate whether their
locations or their embeddness played a role in the way that reporter portrayed the war.
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Results
The data display a general trend toward neutrality in all Washington Post articles
related to the Iraq War during the period of formal warfare. In nearly all categories,
favorability hovered around neutral, with the most favorable coverage concerning the
U.S. soldiers (2.29), and the least favorable for Osama bin Laden (1.37). Within this
overall neutrality, there were statistically significant differences between embedded
and non‑embedded journalists for several variables tested in this project. Additional
differences were observable between journalists, depending on their regional locations.
Of the articles in the sample, 51 (12.9%) were written by embedded journalists. This
represents the largest proportion of articles written outside of the United States. Of
the remaining 344, 276 were written within the United States, 15 were written in
Europe, 14 in the Middle East, and 39 by journalists in Iraq who were not embedded.
Hypothesis 1
Observations were made about the differences between embedded and non‑embedded
journalists’ presentations in two categories; the U.S. military leadership and operation,
and U.S. soldiers. The sample revealed 250 stories dealing with the U.S. military (46
embedded, and 204 non‑embedded) and 174 stories about U.S. soldiers (39 embedded, 135
non‑embedded). Using a T‑test, significant differences were found between embedded and
non‑embedded journalists covering the first category: U.S. military and operation (Table 1).
Coverage of the U.S. military among embedded reporters was 2.28, while non‑embedded
reporters’ portrayal was 1.98 (.35 less). Embedded journalists tended to cover the U.S.
military leadership and operation more favorably than non‑embedded journalists. The
rationale for this relationship became clearer when journalist’s specific locations (embedded,
in Iraq but not embedded, in the Middle East, in Europe, and in the United States) were
compared. While the most favorable coverage of the U.S. military and operation came
from embedded journalists, a statistically significant relationship to embedded journalists
was with journalists in Iraq who were not embedded. Where embedded journalists
covered U.S. military leadership with average 2.28 favorability, non‑embedded journalists in
Iraq expressed favorability of 1.83, a difference of .45.
Regarding favorability toward U.S. soldiers, there were no statistically significant
relationships, regardless of whether journalists were embedded or not, or related to
their location. Embedded journalists’ average coverage tended to be slightly more
favorable than others, but not statistically significantly so. Journalists in all locations
presented U.S. soldiers favorably (mean = 2.29).
Hypothesis 1, regarding the question of whether embeddedness affects coverage of the
U.S. military leadership and operation, and of soldiers, was only partially supported.
While coverage did differ for half the operational categories (U.S. military leadership
operation), coverage of U.S. soldiers was constant and favorable, regardless of the
journalist’s location or embeddedness.
Hypothesis 2
There were 94 articles containing references to Iraqi soldiers. Thirty were written
by embedded journalists, 64 by non‑embedded journalists. Coverage of Iraqi
Issue No.19, June 2008/July 2009
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soldiers during the war was generally negative, averaging 1.70 overall. Using
T‑tests, a statistically significant difference was discovered between embedded and
non‑embedded journalists covering Iraqi soldiers (Table 2). Embedded journalists
averaged slightly less favorable coverage (1.52) than non‑embedded journalists (1.80).
Between locations, the most favorable coverage came from those in Europe, but none
were more favorable than neutral (2.00).
Hypothesis 2 is therefore verified by the data.  Embeddedness apparently did affect
journalists’ relative levels of favorability with regard to Iraqi soldiers. As hypothesised,
embedded journalists depicted Iraqi soldiers less favorably than those who were not
embedded, though all journalists portrayed Iraqi soldiers unfavorably.
Hypothesis 3
Coverage of Iraq’s disposed president, Saddam Hussein, was generally negative,
regardless of the journalist’s location.  Of 171 articles in which Mr. Hussein was
mentioned, 27 were by embedded journalists, and 144 were not. Average level of
favorability was 1.41, and there were no statistically significant differences between
embedded and non‑embedded journalists’ coverage of Mr. Hussein.  There were
no statistically significant differences depending on the journalist’s location, though
the most favorable coverage (1.63) came from journalists in the Middle East, and
journalists in Europe covered Mr. Hussein least favorably (1.25).
Of the 118 articles that mentioned the Iraqi military establishment, 29 were by
embedded journalists, and 89 were written by others. The difference between
embedded and non‑embedded journalists covering the Iraqi military establishment was
statistically significant. Embedded journalists tended to cover the Iraqi military less
favorably (1.36) than non‑embedded journalists (1.64) (Table 3). This relationship also
was observable using a T‑test to compare the means of embedded and non‑embedded
journalists in Iraq. Between these groups, there was a difference in means of .30
(p<.05). Embedded journalists covered the Iraq military with an average favorability
of 1.36. Non‑embedded journalists in Iraq covered them at 1.66 favorability.
Hypothesis 3, like Hypothesis 1, proved to be only partially supported.  Within
the hypothesis, one of two questions proved true.  Coverage of President Hussein,
regardless of the journalist’s location, was negative. Embeddedness did prove to be a
factor in favorability of the Iraqi military establishment. As hypothesised, embedded
journalists depicted the Iraqi military less favorably than those not embedded.
Hypothesis 4
As mentioned previously, Hypothesis 4 was expected to test null.  Given the theoretical
bases for this project, American journalists should express similarly favorable portrayals
of U.S. governmental leadership and decision‑making. As expected, embedded and
non‑embedded journalists covering this topic did not display statistically significant
differences in their coverage of either President Bush or the U.S. government. There
were significant differences in the quantity of coverage for both factors (for President
Bush, embedded journalists produced 17 of 230 articles, and for the U.S. government,
embedded journalists produced 2 of 77). Coverage among both embedded and
non‑embedded journalists expressed similar favorability however, in both categories.
166
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For President Bush, average favorability was 1.74. Although embedded versus
non‑embedded journalists’ coverage was not significantly different, there was a
statistically significant difference in coverage of President Bush based on location. The
most favorable coverage of President Bush was written by embedded journalists (1.85)
and the least favorable by those in Europe (1.42) (Graph 1). Mean favorability for the
U.S. government was 2.00. Though not significantly so, like President Bush, the U.S.
government enjoyed the most favorability from embedded journalists (2.3). The least
favorable coverage came from journalists in the Middle East (1.66).
As expected, hypothesis 4 proved to be null. Coverage of both President Bush and
the U.S. government between embedded and non‑embedded journalists proved to
be similar, though Mr. Bush’s favorability was significantly different based on author
location. Interestingly, coverage of Mr. Bush did not adhere to the theoretical
conceptions for this paper, and was overall negative.
In addition to those categories that I used to directly test the hypotheses, I developed
a number of secondary categories to test for factors surrounding the war and related
to patriotism that were not hypothesised. One question, for instance, was whether
coverage would be different depending on the article’s placement within the
newspaper. I therefore tested whether being on the front page, a section front, or in
another location would make significant differences in coverage. With the exception
of Iraqi soldiers, who were portrayed more favorably on section fronts (2.33) than in
other places in the newspaper (1.61), the results of this query were not significant.
Because during this war the lines were sometimes blurred between Iraqi soldiers and
Iraqi civilians, I also tested journalists’ favorability toward Iraqi citizens. Between
embedded and non‑embedded journalists, and between journalists in different
locations, no significant relationships were discovered. Average coverage tended to
be neutral/favorable (2.09), with the most favorable coverage coming from those
journalists in Europe (2.33), and the least favorable coverage coming from journalists
in Iraq but not embedded (1.95).
Another interesting topic during this war was the role of dissenters and protesters.
These include protesters within and outside the United States, as well as some
prominent statesmen, including French President Jacques Chirac. In order to gauge
how such factors were portrayed in Washington Post coverage, I included operational
categories for Mr. Chirac and war protesters. War protesters were treated consistently
negative by journalists regardless of their location. Journalists in Iraq and embedded
journalists tended to express more favorable impressions of protesters, but these
only represented three of 54 total articles on the topic. Average favorability for war
protesters was 1.87.
President Jacques Chirac was only portrayed by journalists in the United States and
in Europe. There was a statistically significant relationship between these two groups’
portrayals of Mr. Chirac, with journalists in Europe portraying him more favorably
than those in the United States by a margin of .64. European journalists portrayed the
French president with a favorability of 2.31. It is worth noting that only 20 articles
portrayed the French president at all, and only 4 of those were written in Europe. The
remaining 16 were written in the United States, with an average favorability of 1.67.
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Many of the journalists covering the war, perhaps because they were aware of the
changes that were supposedly taking place in the military‑media relationship, also
mentioned mass media itself in their coverage. I therefore endeavored to quantify this
portrayal, to examine the way that media represented itself. Non‑embedded journalists
covered media more often than embedded journalists at a rate of 7:1. Coverage,
however, was not significantly different depending on embeddedness. Average
coverage of media was 1.87, slightly less than favorable.

Conclusions/Discussion
Evidence presented in this study indicates that the embedded journalism project was a
good decision on the part of the U.S. government and military. Overall, in categories
that would indicate support for the conflict and support for participants on the side of
the United States, favorability was higher among embedded journalists than among those
who were not. When looking at journalists with regards to their locations, it is clear that
journalists in the United States and journalists who were embedded presented the most
favorable coverage. In terms of improving the favorability of coverage from journalists
who were in and around the war, the embedded journalism project was a success.
Despite the evidence that supports the assertion that Washington Post journalists who
were embedded produced more favorable coverage of the war than others, another
trend is revealed in the data: that coverage of the war, in general, and even among
embedded journalists, was not particularly favorable. The most striking example is
favorability toward President Bush. Total mean favorability for Mr. Bush was only
1.73 (Table 5). Journalists who were embedded favored Mr. Bush at a rate of 1.85,
and non‑embedded journalists’ favorability was only 1.72. There were no locations
tested in this project in which Mr. Bush received average favorable coverage. There
are a number of possible explanations for this trend including the media’s perceived
watchdog role, and the possibility that U.S. military leadership is correct in its assertion
that journalistic coverage of war tends to be negative.
This data presented about Mr. Bush suggests a question that is fundamental to this
project: whether objectivity can be tested through analysis of journalists’ favorability
toward the war. The data about President Bush can be interpreted in a number of
ways, including as representing objectivity, but the relationship is not conclusive.
Embedded journalists’ improved favorability toward the war and Mr. Bush may be a
function of their relationships with their military units, as a reflection of improved
access to the newsmakers or, just as justifiably, as a function of their lack of access to
other aspects of the war. While the research is suggestive of a relationship between
objectivity and favorability, this relationship is indeterminable in the context of this
study based solely on news content.
Having said that, the research does elucidate some interesting and important
information about the embedded journalism project. One could look to this study for
information about the theories that underpin it.  The data provide support for Herman
and Chomsky’s theories about objectivity and corporate media/government/military
ties.  Herman and Chomsky assert that journalists are more likely to favor official
government sources than other sources. As this study shows, more favorable coverage
emerged from embedded journalists than from those who were not embedded.
Assuming that the government and military sources to which the embedded
168
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journalists were assigned were favorably disposed toward themselves and their mission,
the data indicate this theory holds true.
A second of Herman and Chomsky’s theories that was adapted and used in this project
was anticommunism, (which I turned into antiterrorism). Terrorism being a cultural
enemy, the theory indicates that journalists will be predisposed toward antiterrorist
themes in their coverage, and will disparage those who practice terrorism. This idea
appeared to be supported by the data through the null hypothesis. Overall, coverage
of Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein was negative, regardless of embeddedness or
journalist location. While the concept does not fit into the hypothetical relationship
between relative levels of favorability based on embeddedness, the data appear to
reflect Herman and Chomsky’s original conception, that American journalists would
express unfavorability toward terrorist forces, groups, people and ideas in all cases, and
support for those people and organisations that fight it.
Returning again to the question of objectivity, this project’s data revealed more
favorable coverage from embedded journalists than from others, bringing into
question the theoretical conception of the fog of war. Accepting, for the moment,
the correspondence between favorability and objectivity, it could be argued that the
fog of war that has been used to criticise journalistic coverage of war was lifted by
embedding journalism, simply because journalists now have more access to some
types of information than they had before. This would be supported by findings that
favorability was higher among embedded journalists than others.  However, this data
could equally appropriately describe the furthering of the fog of war as a function of
journalists, physically and emotionally connected with their sources, reflecting their
sources’ feelings about the conflict in their coverage. The data could similarly support
the conclusion that the difference in embedded journalists’ coverage reflected a lack
of access to types of information other than that provided by their military hosts.
The second and third of these assertions are more strongly validated by the data than
the first. If, for instance, embedded journalists’ favorability had gone down or had
oscillated more between variables, it would be more suggestive of the first assertion
because it would indicate a counter‑intuitive relationship in which the journalists
could be shown to think and report more freely.  However, the across‑the‑board more
positive coverage appears symptomatic of the third assertion, which is most strongly
related to the fog of war theory – that embedded journalists’ coverage reflected limited
perspective and information.  However, the data could also suggest an equally strong
validation of the second assertion – that embedded journalists’ positive coverage
reflected an emotional connection with the soldiers.
As noted previously, this project was conceived and pursued preliminarily. Foregoing
comprehensiveness, the project aimed toward an initial exploration of embedded
journalism – questioning whether or not the need exists for future study.  It was
therefore limited; first, although the embedded journalism project was intended at least
in part for television journalism, this project looks only at those journalists writing
for newspapers. This decision necessarily limits the scope of the project in that it
excludes a significant segment of embedded journalists and, more importantly, the
visual aspects of the embedded journalists’ coverage. Second, the project was limited
to the Washington Post, one of several national newspapers that participated in the
embedded journalism project. Such a decision calls into question the differentiation
that may have existed between journalists working for different media outlets. Finally,
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169

Good Embed

as a consequence of the random sampling method, there were a smaller number of
embedded articles than was desired. A different sampling method would provide more
data for analysis, thus more firmly establishing the grounds for comparison. Future
research in this area should therefore endeavor first to look into the question of
objectivity and favorability from the perspective of television news. The added visual
element may prove significant to coverage of the war. Second, as other news sources
may have made entirely different editorial and programmatic choices that could have
changed the journalists’ portrayals; future research should be aimed toward analysis
that occurs across media outlets. Third, research should work to compare embedded
coverage across media platforms (comparing television and newspapers, for instance).
Finally, other sampling methods should be explored to create appropriately large
quantity of data from embedded sources.
Finally, an important question that this project does not intend to address is the
question of effects. We have seen how embedded journalists from the Washington Post
covered the war differently than those who were not embedded. The next logical
question is whether or not such differences had any influence on readers’ perceptions
of the war. True, the difference in coverage was minimal and tended in most cases
toward neutrality, but some would argue that neutral coverage is tacit approval. In
order to really understand whether or not the embedded journalism project was a
success, it would be important to observe and consider how such differences played
out in the hands and minds of the audiences.
Tables/Graphs
Hypothesis 1 ‑ Portrayals of US Military and US Soldiers, embeds v. non‑embeds
Embedded?
N
Mean
US Military
Not Embedded
204 1.98
Embedded
46
2.28
US Soldiers
Not Embedded
135 2.33
Embedded
39
2.19
Table 1     p<.01
Hypothesis 2 ‑ Favorability toward Iraqi Soldiers
embedded?
Iraqi Soldiers
Not Embedded
Embedded
Table 2     p<.05

N
64
30

Mean
1.8
1.52

Hypothesis 3 ‑ Favorability toward President Hussein and Iraqi Military
Embedded?
N
Mean
Not Embedded
144 1.42
President Hussein
Embedded
27
1.38
Iraq Military
Not Embedded
89
1.64
Embedded
29
1.36
Table 3     p<.001

170

Issue No.19, June 2008/July 2009

Asia Pacific Media Educator

Hypothesis 4 ‑ Favorability of President Jacques Chirac
Location
Chirac
USA
Europe

N
16
4

Mean
1.67
2.31

p<.05

Table 4
Graph 1

Average favorability toward President Bush

1.9

1.8

1.7

1.6

1.5

1.4

1.3
USA

Europe

Middle East Iraq (not embedded)

Embedded

Author's Location

Table 5: Descriptive Statistics
Number of
stories
Bush
230
Hussein
171
bin Laden
21
Chirac
20
US government
77
US Military
250
Iraq Military
118
US Soldiers
174
Iraq Soldiers
94
Post-war plans
75
US Public
81
Iraq Public
156
Protesters
54
Media
77
Valid N (listwise)
0
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Minimum

Maximum

Mean

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

3.00
3.00
2.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00

1.7356
1.4080
1.3767
1.8000
2.0036
2.0318
1.5694
2.2947
1.7096
2.1076
2.2342
2.0917
1.8787
1.8658

Std.
Deviation
.56497
.49575
.46199
.55370
.63636
.61177
.56626
.59500
.59952
.60566
.58173
.59626
.45005
.49164

171

Good Embed
Mark Finney, Assistant Professor Mass Communication, Adams State College, USA.
markfinney@adams.edu

References
Alter, J. (2003). ‘In Bed with the Pentagon’. [Electronic Version], Newsweek, 10 March.
Braestrup, P. (1983). Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the
Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington (Abridged ed.), New Haven:Yale University
Press.
Carruthers, S. L. (2000). The Media at War: Communication and Conflict in the Twentieth Century.
New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Cohen, E. D. (1992). Philosophical Issues in Journalism, New York: Oxford University Press.
Coser, L. A. (1956). The Functions of Social Conflict, Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.
Coser, L. A. (1967). Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict, New York: The Free Press.
Fishman, J. M. & Marvin, C. (2003). ‘Portrayals of Violence and Group Difference in Newspaper
Photographs: Nationalism and Media,’ Journal of Communication, 53(1): 32‑44.
Gay,V. (2003). ‘Military Faces War with ‘Embedded’ Journalists in Tow Restrictions Eased, but
Live Coverage Unlikely,’ Seattle Times, Mar 23: A16.
Greenberg, B. S., & Gantz, W. (1993). Desert Storm and the Mass Media, Cresskill, N.J.: Hampton
Press.
Kalb, M. (2003). ‘War and Conflict,’ Editor and Publisher, 136(12): 34.
Kellner, D. (1992). The Persian Gulf TV War, Boulder: Westview Press.
Herman, E. S. & Chomsky, N. (1988). Manufacturing Consent:The Political Economy of the Mass
Media. New York: Pantheon.
Lederman, J. (1991). Battle Lines:The American Media and the Intifada (1st ed.), New York: Holt.
MacGregor, B. (1997). Live, Direct, and Biased?: Making Television News in the Satellite Age, London;
New York, New York: Arnold; Distributed exclusively in the USA by St. Marin’s Press.
Matthews, L. J., & Institute of Land Warfare (Association of the United States Army). (1991).
Newsmen & National Defense: Is Conflict Inevitable? Washington: Brassey’s (US).
McLaughlin, G. (2002). The War Correspondent, London; Sterling,Va.: Pluto Press.
McNair, B. (1988). Images of the Enemy: Reporting the New Cold War, London; New York :
Routledge.
Minear, L., Scott, C., & Weiss, T. G. (1996). The News Media, Civil War, and Humanitarian Action,
Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner.
Mueller, J. E. (1973). War, Presidents, and Public Opinion, New York: Wiley.
O’Clery, C. (2003). ‘US Army of “Embeds” Prepares to Sell War to Americans,’ The Irish Times,
Feb. 22: p. 12.
Rampton, S. & Sauber, J. (2003). Weapons of Mass Deception:The Uses of Propaganda in Bush’s War
on Iraq, New York: Penguin.
Reeves, J. L., & Campbell, R. (1994). Cracked Coverage:Television News, the Anti‑Cocaine Crusade,
and the Reagan Legacy, Durham: Duke University Press.
Shaw, M. (1996). Civil Society and Media in Global Crises: Representing Distant Violence, New York:
Pinter.
Soley, L. C. (1992). The News Shapers:The Sources who Explain the News. New York: Praeger.
Strentz, H. (1989). News Reporters and News Sources: Accomplices in Shaping and Mis‑shaping the
News (2nd ed.), Ames: Iowa State University Press.

172

Issue No.19, June 2008/July 2009

